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Statistical learning (SL) studies have shown that participants are able to extract regularities
in input they are exposed to without any instruction to do so. This and other ﬁndings,
such as the fact that participants are often unable to verbalize their acquired knowledge,
suggest that SL can occur implicitly or incidentally. Interestingly, several studies using the
related paradigms of artiﬁcial grammar learning and serial response time tasks have shown
that explicit instructions can aid learning under certain conditions.Within the SL literature,
however, very few studies have contrasted incidental and intentional learning conditions.
The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of having prior knowledge
of the statistical regularities in the input when undertaking a task of visual sequential
SL. Speciﬁcally, we compared the degree of SL exhibited by participants who were
informed (intentional group) versus those who were uninformed (incidental group) about
the presence of embedded triplets within a familiarization stream. Somewhat surprisingly,
our results revealed that there were no statistically signiﬁcant differences (and only a small
effect size) in the amount of SL exhibited between the intentional versus the incidental
groups. We discuss the ways in which this result can be interpreted and suggest that
short presentation times for stimuli in the familiarization stream in our study may have
limited the opportunity for explicit learning. This suggestion is in line with recent research
revealing a statistically signiﬁcant difference (and a large effect size) between intentional
versus incidental groups using a very similar visual sequential SL task, but with longer
presentation times. Finally, we outline a number of directions for future research.
Keywords: statistical learning, visual statistical learning, sequence learning, incidental, intentional, implicit
learning, explicit learning
INTRODUCTION
Many of our beliefs and decisions are generated by brain pro-
cesses that are not available to consciousness (Eagleman, 2011;
Kahneman, 2011). Indeed, it would appear that much of our
learning proceeds implicitly. A number of studies have demon-
strated that the acquisition of many of our most fundamental
abilities, such as motor skills, object recognition, and language,
rely on adaptations to regularities in the world that proceed
without an intention to learn and without the involvement of con-
scious awareness (Cleeremans et al., 1998; Perruchet and Pacton,
2006). However, it is also clear that many aspects of the learn-
ing of complex abilities can be enhanced with explicit instruction.
This raises the question of whether we have two different sys-
tems of learning, one implicit and one explicit, and if so, how
to tease the two apart (French and Cleeremans, 2002). A num-
ber of lesion and brain imaging studies have investigated whether
the neural systems supporting explicit and implicit learning are
dissociable (e.g., Willingham et al., 2002; Meulemans and Van
der Linden, 2003; Reber et al., 2003; Rüsseler et al., 2003; Schen-
dan et al., 2003; Aizenstein et al., 2004; Vandenberghe et al., 2006;
Ferdinand et al., 2010; Yang and Li, 2012). So far, ﬁndings relat-
ing to this issue have been contradictory – complicated by the
use of different experimental designs in the various studies (for
a review focusing on sequence learning, see Gheysen and Fias,
2012). A related question, explored in the current study, is how
awareness of the regularities to be learned inﬂuences the learning
outcome. Does “trying to learn” and “knowing what to look for”
in the input improve learning? Is it possible that the conscious
search for regularities in the input might actually interfere with
learning?
In an early experiment within the domain of artiﬁcial gram-
mar learning (AGL), Reber (1976) compared the effects of giving
participants explicit versus implicit instructions. In the explicit
condition, participants were directed to search for the complex
rules which determined letter orderings, while in the implicit
condition no mention of rules was made. Results showed that
participants given explicit instructions performed more poorly in
all aspects of the experiment than did those given implicit instruc-
tions: They memorized the exemplars more slowly, were poorer at
determining whether letter-strings were well-formed and tended
to invent rules that were not representative of the stimuli. This
led Reber (1976) to suggest that one could approach the task with
either an explicit or implicit learning mode. He hypothesized that
the explicit rule-searching strategy may be effective if the stim-
ulus patterns to be discovered are relatively simple and codable.
However, when patterns become more complex and the time to
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encode them is short, explicit instructions may disrupt perfor-
mance by encouraging participants to engage in futile rule-search
procedures which will frequently lead to invention of rules which
are not accurate representations of the stimulus structure. It is
worth noting that in the study by Reber (1976) participants who
received explicit instructions were not provided with any speciﬁc
information about the types of regularities that they would be
exposed to; they were simply informed that the stimulus materials
were determined by rules and that ﬁguring out the rules would be
to their advantage.
A number of subsequent studies have failed to replicate Reber’s
(1976) ﬁnding that explicit instructions can have a detrimental
effect on AGL. Studies using the same instructional set as Reber
(1976) have generally found that there is no difference in learn-
ing between explicitly and implicitly instructed participants (e.g.,
Dulany et al., 1984; Dienes et al., 1991). However, the few studies
which have provided participants with more speciﬁc informa-
tion about the types of regularities to be learned, have tended to
ﬁnd an advantage of explicit instructions (e.g., Howard and Bal-
las, 1980; Reber et al., 1980). In the study by Reber et al. (1980)
participants received explicit instructions regarding the actual
schematic structure of the artiﬁcial grammar and were given a
7 min “course” on how this structure could be used to generate
strings of symbols. Moreover, the time at which this instruction
was given was manipulated: one group were given instructions at
the outset, one group received them in the middle of the train-
ing, and for a third group the instructions were delayed until
after they had seen all the training items. A key ﬁnding in this
study was that the earlier in the training phase that the explicit
instruction was given, the larger was the facilitative effect of the
instruction.
Within the related literature of serial response time (SRT) tasks,
several studies have found that explicit instructions have been
beneﬁcial when the pattern is simple, but that they have had no
effect when the pattern is more complex or subtle (e.g., Fren-
sch and Miner, 1994; Jiménez et al., 1996). Howard and Howard
(2001) observed that intentional instructions to search for a pat-
tern in the input disrupted learning for older, but not younger
adults. To explain these results, they suggested that the simultane-
ous demands of automatic implicit tracking of covariation along
with the active search for rules exceeded the processing capac-
ity of older adults. Note, that in these SRT studies, the explicit
instructions consisted of general information that the stimuli were
governed by rules or followed a systematic pattern, and no speciﬁc
information about the nature of the rule or pattern was pro-
vided (i.e., participants were told they should try to discover these
rules).
In sum, AGL and SRT studies have yielded somewhat contra-
dictory ﬁndings with regard to the effects of explicit instructions.
However, most studies appear to agree that explicit instructions
work better (1) when the rules or patterns governing the stimuli
are simple rather than complex and (2) when speciﬁc information
about the nature of the rules or patterns are provided rather than
general instructions to search for rules or patterns.
AGL and SRT studies are two important research paradigms
used to study implicit learning. A third major paradigm is statisti-
cal learning (SL), a term which was coined by Saffran et al. (1996)
to describe infants’ ability to segment regularities from the speech
stream. In the early years of SL research, the assumption that SL is a
form of implicit learning was typically based on indirect evidence.
For example, it was often emphasized that participants in SL stud-
ies succeed in extracting the underlying statistical structure of the
input without receiving any instructions to do so, and that they
are generally unable to verbalize the knowledge that is manifest in
their familiarity judgments or reaction times (see recent reviews:
Romberg and Saffran, 2010; Arciuli and Torkildsen, 2012; Aslin
and Newport, 2012). While such ﬁndings indicate that SL likely
operates implicitly, they are not direct tests of the role of conscious
awareness in SL.
Recently, a number of SL studies have taken up the challenge
to provide more direct tests of the role of conscious awareness
in SL (Kim et al., 2009; Turk-Browne et al., 2009; Franco et al.,
2011; Bertels et al., 2012). These studies have adopted a vari-
ety of methods from the related literatures on motor sequence
learning, AGL, and category learning to assess the conscious sta-
tus of the acquired knowledge. In an fMRI study of visual SL,
Turk-Browne et al. (2009) observed neural responses to statistical
structure in areas generally associated with implicit learning, such
as the striatum and the medial temporal lobe. Moreover, in a ver-
bal debrieﬁng session, most participants reported no awareness
of the statistical structure, and there was no obvious relation-
ship between these verbal reports and accuracy on a behavioral
familiarity test. Taken together, these ﬁndings were interpreted as
evidence that the acquired knowledge was largely implicit. These
results are in line with the study by Kim et al. (2009) where sub-
jects’ reaction times showed evidence of implicit learning of visual
sequences, but where there was no evidence of learning in a task
measuring explicit knowledge. However, Bertels et al. (2012) and
Franco et al. (2011) questioned whether the lack of explicit learn-
ing in the study by Kim et al. (2009) could be driven by task
difﬁculty, rather than the absence of explicit knowledge. To test
this assumption, Bertels et al. (2012) performed a replication of
the Kim et al. (2009) study using a simpler task measuring explicit
knowledge and found evidence of explicit learning. Moreover, per-
formance in the explicit learning task was associated with subjects’
conﬁdence ratings, suggesting that at least part of their knowl-
edge was available to conscious awareness. Franco et al. (2011)
employed an adaptation of the Process-Dissociation Procedure
(PDP; Jacoby, 1991) in order to assess whether subjects could
consciously manipulate the acquired knowledge in a word seg-
mentation task. The PDP involves contrasting performance in two
versions of the same task: an inclusion task where conscious atten-
tion and unconscious inﬂuences act in concert and an exclusion
task where conscious attention and unconscious inﬂuences act
against each other. Results showed that participants who were able
to learn the two artiﬁcial languages used in the study, were able
to intentionally exclude items from one of two learned languages,
suggesting that the acquired knowledge was available to conscious
awareness.
The above studies have provided valuable, though some-
what conﬂicting, evidence about the degree to which knowledge
acquired in SL tasks is available to conscious awareness. The studies
by Franco et al. (2011) and Bertels et al. (2012) suggest that partici-
pants can gain some awareness of statistical regularities in SL tasks,
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even when no instructions are provided. This ﬁnding calls for a
distinction between incidental learning conditions (not receiving
any instructions) and implicit learning. In other words, partici-
pants may not be completely reliant on instructions in order to
engage in explicit learning. However, based on the ﬁndings in the
AGL and SRT studies reviewed above, it would appear that instruc-
tions can still have a facilitative effect compared to no instructions,
especially if experimenters provide speciﬁc information about the
regularities to be learned. However, within the research tradition
of SL, the effect of explicit instructions on the amount of learning
is largely unexplored.
In fact, we know of only three SL studies which have investi-
gated the effects of modifying the instructions given to participants
(Kachergis et al., 2010; Hamrick and Rebuschat, 2012; Stevens
et al., in press). Two of these studies have employed the cross-
situational word learning paradigm, which is often assumed to be
a type of SL task (Smith and Yu, 2008). In this paradigm, partici-
pants are to inferword-picturemappingswhen presentedwith one
word and multiple possible referents in each trial, a task which can
only be solved if relations between referents and words are tracked
across multiple trials.
Kachergis et al. (2010) investigated the effect of different
instructions on cross-situational word learning in adults. Instruc-
tions were used as a within-subjects variable, so that the same
subjects received increasingly explicit instructions during three
phases of the experiment: In the ﬁrst two experimental blocks,
participants were simply told to remember each word and each
object for a subsequent memory test. In the third block, they
were explicitly asked to remember how many times each word
and object appeared together during training. In the fourth
and ﬁnal block, they were asked to learn the meanings of the
words, a type of instruction which matches those given in pre-
vious cross-situational word learning studies. Results showed
signiﬁcant learning even in experimental blocks where the tar-
get of learning (word-picture associations) was not mentioned,
suggesting that cross-situational learning can proceed inciden-
tally. However, learning was superior when subjects were told
explicitly to look for word–picture co-occurrences or to learn
word meanings, indicating that strategic inference also plays a
role.
Another investigation of cross-situational word learning under
incidental and intentional conditions was carried out by Hamrick
and Rebuschat (2012). This study differed from Kachergis et al.
(2010) by including subjective measures of awareness at the end
of the experiment and in using instructions as a between-subjects
variable. The intentional group in this experiment received explicit
instructions to learn word meanings, and was told that they would
be tested afterward. The incidental group was not informed about
the purpose of the experiment or that they would be tested after-
ward. Instead, participants in the incidental group were asked to
perform a task that was unrelated to the statistical structure (indi-
cate how many objects in each trial were animate). Participants
in both the intentional and incidental groups displayed signiﬁ-
cant learning, but the learning effect was larger under intentional
than incidental learning conditions. However, as the two groups
differed both in the instructions they had received before the train-
ing phase and in the cover task that was only given to the incidental
group, the differences in learning effects could be due to either of
these manipulations.
The above studies have provided evidence that performance
in a cross-situational learning task is aided by explicit instruc-
tions. There is, however, some dispute as to whether participants
use SL mechanisms in this task, or whether they employ hypoth-
esis testing strategies to learn the word-referent mappings (e.g.,
Medina et al., 2011; Trueswell et al., 2013). Thus, it is worthwhile
to conduct studies with other types of SL tasks before drawing
conclusions about the effect of explicit instructions on SL.
A study conducted by Stevens et al. (in press), in the same lab
as the current study, was designed to assess the impact of concur-
rent physical movement on learning when SL is performed under
incidental versus intentional conditions. The physical movement
task required participants to cycle on a stationary bike during
the familiarization phase – participants in one group cycled at
moderate intensity while another group of participants engaged
in resistance free cycling. In addition there were control groups
where participants were not engaged in concurrent physical move-
ment but still sat on a stationary bike during the familiarization
phase. All groups engaged in the test phase while seated at a desk.
The aims of that study were quite different to the aims of the
current study. However, as in the current study, the Stevens et al.
(in press) study employed a visual sequence learning task, the
embedded triplet paradigm, and used the same kinds of stim-
uli reported here, cartoon-like ﬁgures loosely described as aliens.
While some of the key ﬁndings of the Stevens et al. (in press)
study are not relevant to the discussion presented here the ﬁnd-
ings relating to the control groups are relevant. Stevens et al. (in
press) included two control groups: a control group in Experi-
ment 1 that received no instructions to learn, and a control group
in Experiment 2 that received explicit guidance on learning the
embedded triplets during familiarization. Using a stimulus pre-
sentation time of 800ms, the Stevens et al. (in press) study revealed
that both control groups showed signiﬁcant learning (above 50%),
but that the intentional group demonstrated higher learning than
the incidental group.
The aim of the present study was to further investigate how
explicit versus implicit test instructions affect performance in a
typical SL task. As the three previous studies mentioned above
(Kachergis et al., 2010; Hamrick and Rebuschat, 2012; Stevens
et al., in press), we studied the effect of having conscious knowl-
edge of the statistical structure to be learned prior to learning.
However, unlike two of the previous studies which investigated the
ability to learn label-object pairings, but like the study by Stevens
et al. (inpress), the present study examined sensitivity to sequential
relationships.We employed a visual paradigmwhich has beenused
extensively in the SL literature: the embedded triplet paradigm
(e.g., Fiser and Aslin, 2002; Turk-Browne et al., 2005; Brady and
Oliva, 2008; Turk-Browne et al., 2009; Arciuli and Simpson, 2011,
2012a,b). Using a between-subjects design we compared the detec-
tion of embedded triplets in an incidental version of the task (i.e.,
implicit as there was no instruction to learn) versus an intentional
version of the task (i.e., explicit as there was clear instruction
regarding what to learn). The instructions given in the present
study had the two characteristics that have been found to facil-
itate learning in AGL studies and SRT tasks (see above): (1) the
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regularities in the input were simple rather than complex (embed-
ded triplet sequences) and (2) participants were provided with
speciﬁc information about the nature of the regularities rather
than general instructions to look for patterns.
Importantly, the only difference between the intentional and
incidental versions of the experiment was the instructions given
before the familiarization phase. Thus, any difference in per-
formance between the incidental and intentional groups could
be attributed to the instructions alone. Another important fea-
ture of the present experiment is the presentation speed. In
order to provide maximum contrast with the long presenta-
tion time (800 ms) used by Stevens et al. (in press), we used
a stimulus presentation time of 200 ms. Two previous stud-
ies have shown that SL can occur at this very fast stimulus
presentation rate of 200 ms (Turk-Browne et al., 2005; Arci-
uli and Simpson, 2011). However, the effect of instructions




Approval to conduct the study was granted from the University of
Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee. A total of 23 female
undergraduates from the University of Sydney ranging in age from
18–25 years volunteered to take part in the current study in return
for course credit. Participants were randomly allocated to either
the incidental-or intentional-instruction condition.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
The design of the embedded triplet SL task was similar to that
reported in three previous studies by Arciuli and Simpson (2011,
2012a,b). It was comprised of two separate phases: a familiar-
ization phase followed by a test phase. Stimuli were eighteen
cartoon-like ﬁgures, loosely described as aliens, sourced from the
website http://www.clipartconnection.com/en/1. As in previous
published studies by Arciuli and Simpson (2011, 2012a,b) and
the study by Stevens et al. (in press) these cartoon-like ﬁgures
were deliberately chosen because they are not easy to verbalize.
That is the cartoon-like ﬁgures are not easily characterized based
on their deﬁning features. This can be conﬁrmed by examining
the stimuli that are supplied in the Appendices of the previously
published work. Twelve of the aliens were chosen as stimuli for
the experiment, and these were divided into four groups of three
(four base triplets) hereafter referred to as ABC, DEF, GHI, and
JKL. The remaining six aliens were used only during instructional
and practice phases as examples. This ensured that viewing spe-
ciﬁc stimuli during the instruction phase did not inﬂuence the
degree of learning during the familiarization phase. The 12 aliens
used for testing, along with the triplet groupings are shown in
Appendix A.
Familiarization phase
The familiarization phase consisted of a continuous stream of
stimuli, with each alien shown in isolation in the center of the
1Access to this website is via subscription. Images can be legally downloaded from
this website during the subscription period and can be used in print or electronic
form indeﬁnitely.
display against a white background. Each alien was visible for
200 ms with an inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) of 200 ms. Return-
ing to the point about our alien stimuli being chosen because
they were not easily verbalizable we would like to emphasize that
a stimulus presentation time of 200 ms using unfamiliar com-
plex ﬁgures – in our case, cartoon-like aliens – leaves very little
opportunity to attempt to name (i.e., verbalize) each ﬁgure. Each
base triplet was selected for inclusion 24 times each (giving a total
of 96 triplets). For six of these 24 instances, one of the aliens
was presented with a yellow background, instead of the usual
white background, in order to provide a cover task. The cover
task ensured that participants paid attention to the familiariza-
tion stream as they were required to press a button whenever
they saw an alien with a yellow background (described in the
instructions as a“radioactive”alien). Radioactive alienswere coun-
terbalanced among the three aliens within each triplet so that each
appeared radioactive on two occasions. In total, the familiariza-
tion stream consisted of 288 individual aliens, with each of the 12
aliens appearing 24 times each, and 24 of the aliens appearing as
radioactive.
The order of the triplets within the familiarization stream
was randomized with the single restriction that the same base
triplet could not appear consecutively (e.g., ABCABC). Due to
these constraints, four different pre-randomized familiarization
lists were created with each participant viewing one of these four
lists. After three trials in which participants practiced identify-
ing the radioactive aliens, participants in the explicit instruction
group were given the additional information that the aliens usu-
ally appeared in groups of three, and that they would be asked
later if they could identify these groupings. Participants in the
implicit learning condition were naïve as to the existence of these
groupings.
Test phase
For the test phase four new triplets were created, with each
containing one alien from each of three base triplets. Due to
the ordering constraints, these new triplets never appeared in
the familiarization stream. These four impossible triplets are
referred to as AEI, DHL, GKC, and JBF. For each test trial,
one actual base triplet was displayed along with one impossible
triplet. The aliens in each triplet were presented one at a time
using the same presentation time and ISI used in the familiar-
ization phase with a 1,000 ms gap separating the base triplet
from the impossible triplet. After all six aliens had been pre-
sented a new screen appeared which prompted participants to
identify which of the two triplets had appeared previously in
the familiarization phase, with no time constraints imposed.
Each base triplet was presented with each impossible triplet on
four separate occasions with the presentation order counter-
balanced. Across the 64 test trials each base triplet was seen
16 times and each impossible triplet was seen 16 times. This
insured that if any SL took place during the test phase itself,
the opportunities to learn were equal for both types of triplet.
Each participant received a different random order for the test tri-
als. Item presentation and data collection in both phases were
controlled using E-prime software (version 2; Schneider et al.,
2002).
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RESULTS
In analyzing our results, data from the familiarization phase were
inspected to determine the number of “radioactive” aliens suc-
cessfully identiﬁed. Correct identiﬁcation was deﬁned as pressing
a button within 3 s of the onset of these aliens. Participants
who failed to identify at least 18 of the 24 “radioactive” aliens
were excluded on the grounds that they may not have been
attending to the familiarization stream. As a result of this screen-
ing, one participant was excluded from the explicit instruction
condition.
Data from the test phase were inspected to determine the
number of base triplets successfully identiﬁed by each partici-
pant (as a percentage of the overall number of trials in the test
phase). Within each of the two instruction conditions, partici-
pants who scored ±2 SDs from the mean of that condition were
excluded. This resulted in the exclusion of one participant from
the implicit instruction condition who had an excessively low
score. Table 1 summarizes the test performance for the retained
participants.
Chance performance is reﬂected in correct identiﬁcation of
50% of the base triplets presented during the test phase. SL can be
said to have occurred if signiﬁcantlymore than 50%of base triplets
were correctly identiﬁed. Overall, the 21 participants demon-
strated signiﬁcant SL (mean61.1%,one-sample t-test t[20]=3.49,
p=0.002,d =0.76). Todetermine if SLoccurredwithin eachof the
instruction conditions two separate one-sample t-tests were per-
formed comparing the SL elicited in each instruction condition
with the chance rate of 50%. Both tests proved to be signiﬁ-
cant; t(9)Explicit = 2.54, p = 0.032, d = 0.80; t(10)Implicit = 2.41,
p = 0.037, d = 0.73. To determine if instruction condition affected
the amount of SL, an independent samples t-test was conducted.
This was not signiﬁcant, t(19) < 1, p = 0.411, suggesting that the
amount of SL was similar for each learning condition. The effect
size was small (d = 0.36).
To strengthen the argument that there was no meaningful
difference between the two groups we also performed Bayesian
analysis incorporating Markov chain Monte Carlo estimation
(Kruschke, 2013). This technique provides distributions of likely
means, standard deviations, and effect sizes, given the data. From
these distributions, a range of credible values can be estimated.
Speciﬁcally, we used these distributions to test group differences
against a difference of 0. From this analysis the mean difference
between the two groups was estimated to be 5.22 with a 95% high-
est density interval (HDI) of (−10.6, 21.3). Had a robust difference
Table 1 | Mean percentage of triplets successfully identified in the test
phase for retained participants in each instruction condition.
Learning n Test phase
Condition Mean SD Min Max
Implicit 11 58.5 11.8 40.6 75.0
Explicit 10 63.9 17.3 40.6 89.1
Total 21 61.1 14.6 40.6 89.1
existed between the two groups, zero would have fallen outside of
theHDI. Thus, the Bayesian analysis indicates that there is no cred-
ible difference between the means, which is in accordance with the
t-test result.
DISCUSSION
Our results revealed that there was no reliable difference in visual
sequence learning in the incidental versus intentional versions of
the task. This result stands in opposition to ﬁndings in previous
studies which have compared SL under incidental and intentional
conditions (Kachergis et al., 2010; Hamrick and Rebuschat, 2012;
Stevens et al., in press). All of these previous studies observed bet-
ter performance in the intentional than in the incidental version
of the task. There is, however, one important difference between
the current study and these three previous studies. The current
study used a short stimulus presentation time, where each visual
stimulus was visible for only 200 ms. In the cross-situational
word learning studies by Kachergis et al. (2010) and Hamrick
and Rebuschat (2012) the stimuli were visible for 6 and 14 s,
respectively. In the study by Stevens et al. (in press) which used
the same embedded triplet paradigm and the same cartoon-like
aliens that we used in the current study, each stimulus was vis-
ible for 800 ms. This means that, of the three previous studies
mentioned above, even in the study with the shortest presenta-
tion times (i.e., Stevens et al., in press), participants were given
four times longer to process each image than the participants in
the current study. Thus, it seems possible that the short stim-
ulus presentation time used in the current study precluded the
use of explicit strategies to learn the embedded patterns in the
familiarization stream.
The ﬁndings in the present study are in line with a num-
ber of studies in the ﬁelds of AGL and SRT tasks which have
found no difference in the amount of learning between explic-
itly and implicitly instructed subjects (e.g., Dulany et al., 1984;
Dienes et al., 1991; Jiménez et al., 1996). However, the instruc-
tions given in those previous studies were generally much less
speciﬁc than in the present study. The few studies within these
paradigms that have provided subjects with speciﬁc information
about the rules or patterns to be learned, have found better learn-
ing in the explicit than the implicit condition (Howard and Ballas,
1980; Reber et al., 1980). In terms of the speciﬁcity of instruc-
tions, the latter studies are more directly comparable to the present
study. It should be noted, though, that in the Reber et al. (1980)
study, explicitly instructed participants were given a 10 min train-
ing procedure – not only were they informed about the speciﬁc
rules, they were also asked to generate strings based on the rules.
Moreover, the stimulus presentation times were much longer
than in the present study. The experiment by Howard and Ballas
(1980) used presentation times more comparable to the present
study (320 msec for each stimulus item), but in that experiment
auditory stimuli were used, and as will be suggested below, presen-
tation time might have different effects for visual versus auditory
stimuli.
One way of examining the hypothesis that short presentation
times may hinder the use of explicit strategies, is to further investi-
gate SL under incidental and intentional conditions using a variety
of stimulus presentation times. We are not aware of any studies in
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the ﬁeld of SL, or in the related ﬁelds of AGL, probability learning,
motor sequence learning, or category learning that have investi-
gated a possible interaction between instructions and presentation
speed. Some results indicate, however, that it may be more fruit-
ful to investigate this question in the visual rather than auditory
domain, as visual SL performance (at least for sequential stimuli)
appears to be more affected by presentation speed. A study by
Conway and Christiansen (2009) comparing SL in adults in differ-
ent presentation formats (visual input distributed spatially, visual
input distributed sequentially, and auditory input distributed
sequentially) and at different presentation speeds, found that faster
presentation rates (going from four elements per second to eight
elements per second) led to a decline in SL only for the visual input
that was presented sequentially. Similar ﬁndings were reported in
a study by Arciuli and Simpson (2011) which used the embedded
triplet paradigm to study visual sequence learning in 5–12 year old
children – learning increased with slower presentation times for
stimuli.
An alternative interpretation of the ﬁndings in the current
study is that participants in the intentional group were in fact
using explicit learning strategies based on the instructions, and
that participants in the incidental group were able to gain enough
awareness of the regularities in the input to develop comparable
explicit strategies. We did not ask participants in the incidental
group whether they had gained awareness of any embedded pat-
terns or whether they had tried to use strategies, so we cannot
refute or conﬁrm this possibility. In a visual embedded triplet
task where no explicit instructions were given, Bertels et al. (2012)
found that subjects gained some conscious knowledge of the regu-
larities in the input, even though the presentation ratewas as fast as
in the current study (200 ms). More speciﬁcally, data from a con-
ﬁdence judgment task was compared to actual performance, and
showed that participants judged that they remembered the correct
sequence 54% of the time when they were actually correct, and
43% of the time when they were incorrect, a difference that was
statistically signiﬁcant. Based on this result, it is possible that the
participants in the incidental condition of the present study gained
some conscious awareness of the stimuli. However, it is unlikely
that incidentally instructed participants gained awareness of the
regularities to the degree necessary to employ learning strate-
gies comparable to the intentionally instructed group. Results
from previous AGL studies suggest that intentional instructions
of sufﬁcient speciﬁcity aid the use of explicit learning strate-
gies and lead to better performance (Howard and Ballas, 1980;
Reber et al., 1980). As discussed in more detail below, results from
the SL study by Stevens et al. (in press) are in line with these
ﬁndings.
Stevens et al. (in press) explored the effects of concurrent phys-
ical movement on SL. However, that study included two control
groups that are useful for the purposes of cross-study comparison.
Stevens et al. (in press) included a control group in Experiment 1
that received no instructions to learn (n = 12), and a control
group in Experiment 2 that received explicit guidance on what
to learn (n = 10). These control groups are comparable with
the incidental and intentional conditions reported in the current
study. Each of the control groups in the study by Stevens et al.
(in press) showed statistically signiﬁcant learning (above 50%).
However, the intentional group demonstrated higher learning. A
direct test of whether this difference was statistically signiﬁcant
was not reported in the Stevens et al. (in press) paper. However, we
have re-analyzed that data and are able to report that an indepen-
dent samples t-test revealed a signiﬁcant difference, t(20) = 22.06,
p < 0.001. It is important to note that the effect size associated
with the difference was large (d = 2.05). Participant numbers in
the Stevens et al. (in press) paper (n = 22 in total) are almost iden-
tical to the participant numbers in the current study (n = 21 in
total). Yet, there is a signiﬁcant difference between means accom-
panied by a large effect size in the Stevens et al. (in press) data
set while, in the current study, we observed a non-signiﬁcant
difference accompanied by a small effect size.
In sum, both AGL studies and a study using a comparable
SL paradigm have shown that speciﬁc explicit instructions can
improve learning outcome. Thus, if the intentional group in the
present study had been able to beneﬁt from the instructions, it
seems unlikely that the incidental group would have managed
to perform comparably to the intentional group. Consequently,
we reiterate that one possible interpretation of the discrepancy
in results between the Stevens et al. (in press) and the current
study is that with a slow stimulus presentation speed (800 ms per
stimulus), the participants in the intentional control group in the
Stevens et al. (in press) study were able to learn the embedded
triplets explicitly. By contrast, with a fast stimulus presentation
speed (200 ms per stimulus) the participants in the intentional
group in the current studywere less able to exploit explicit learning
strategies.
Taken together, the ﬁndings of SL studies comparing learning
under intentional and incidental conditions suggest that explicit
learning is superior to implicit learning, at least when the regular-
ities to be learned are relatively simple and stimulus presentation
times are not fast. However, we think that there may be other
factors that should be taken into consideration. For example,
much of the SL research, including that reported here and by
Stevens et al. (in press) assesses immediate learning. Much less is
known about retention of the learned material. The handful of
studies that have examined rates of forgetting for implicit SL sug-
gest slow decay rates, contrary to what would be expected if the
knowledge was explicit (Kim et al., 2009; Arciuli and Simpson,
2012b). It would be interesting to investigate rates of forgetting in
incidental versus intentional groups using short versus long pre-
sentation times. Similarly,we reiterate thatmuchof the SL research
reports on stimuli that are associated with relatively simple sta-
tistical regularities. One might speculate that as the complexity
of the statistical regularities increases, it becomes difﬁcult, per-
haps even impossible, to explicitly communicate these regularities
to participants in a coherent way, let alone observe participants’
explicit learning of these regularities. Comparison of incidental
versus intentional conditions using SL tasks with simple versus
complex statistical regularities is another interesting avenue for
future research.
In conclusion, we propose that SL mainly operates implicitly
when presentation times are short. Under these conditions, pro-
vision of explicit instruction regarding the nature of embedded
regularities to be learned does not appear to enhance learn-
ing. With longer presentation times differences between SL
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tasks administered under intentional versus incidental learning
conditions may emerge and, under such conditions, explicit
learning may be more effective than implicit learning, possibly
contingent upon the statistical regularities to be learned being
relatively simple.
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